During the Second Punic War, and especially in light of Cannae, Hannibal could be called the general who won the battle but lost the war. Why is this so?

The Second Punic War, fought between Carthage and Rome from 218 to 201 BC, was a key event in ancient history. This conflict saw Hannibal Barca of Carthage become one of the most famous military leaders in recorded history. His successful campaigns against Rome included his legendary victory at Cannae in 216 BC, where he defeated a numerically superior Roman army with an innovative strategy involving a double-envelopment maneuver – an audacious operation that has been studied by military strategists ever since (Mitchell, 2019). After this battle, some have argued that Hannibal won the battle but lost the war due to his failure to take advantage of his success and press home his strategic gains.

One of the main reasons for this is that Hannibal did not follow up on his victory at Cannae with either a siege or further attacks on Rome. Following Cannae, it would have been reasonable for him to march towards Rome even if he had no intention of attempting its capture; this could have given him the upper hand politically and allowed him to apply pressure on the Senate while they were preoccupied dealing with such a threat (Hanfmann & Knowles, 1966). Instead however, he chose simply to remain in Apulia near Cannae while continuing guerrilla tactics throughout Italy rather than engaging large scale battles with Roman forces. As Michael Mitchel notes “Hannibal effectively wasted two years following Cannae as he conducted raids throughout southern Italy which resulted in little overall gain” (Mitchel 2019). Such delays gave Rome time for their own strategies – including recruiting new conscripts and levying fresh allies – enabling them ultimately prevail over their adversary.

Similarly important was Hannibal’s failure properly exploit Spanish resources during the course of war . Although Spain had originally defected from Roman control soon after it began hostilities against Carthage there was much potential still within these territories; so much so that Rome eventually responded by sending Publius Cornelius Scipio into Iberia who managed considerable successes there (Caven 1990). However despite any favorable conditions presented by Spanish alliance Hannibal failed capitalize upon them – instead concentrating almost exclusively upon Italian operations making effective use only sporadic naval assistance provided by Syphax King Numidia (Fortuna 2017). Consequently without sufficient manpower or supplies from Spain combined illogical tactical decision making led directly to eventual defeat when faced off against Scipio Africanus’s more organized forces at Zama 202 BC.

All told then whilst it is true that many regard Hannibals victories over Romans forces as some great tactical masterstroke despite this alone being insufficient secure ultimate success required both sound tactical capabilities decisive leadership skills capable exploiting every asset available ensure advantageous position enemy both militarily politically terms political expediency brought about end Second Punic War therefore notwithstanding brilliance displayed battlefield must concede general who won battle lost war due inability capitalise upon advantages held following initial successes